Michigan Law Review
Volume 44

Issue 3

1945

INSURANCE-MISREPRESENTATION-FALSE ANSWERS INSERTED
IN APPLICATION BY SOLICITING AGENT
Milton D. Solomon S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Insurance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Milton D. Solomon S.Ed., INSURANCE-MISREPRESENTATION-FALSE ANSWERS INSERTED IN
APPLICATION BY SOLICITING AGENT, 44 MICH. L. REV. 484 (1945).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/11

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

INSURANCE-MISREPRESENTATION-FALSE ANSWERS INSERTED IN APPLICATION BY SOLICITING AGENT-The plaintiff brought this action against
the defendant insurance company as beneficiary of a life insurance policy. The
insured signed the application in blank and the soliciting agent inserted false
answers to questions in the application concerning medical attendance and prior
application for insurance. The application was inserted in and became a part of
the policy. The policy was mailed by the defendant to the insured with a return
post-card wherein it was stated that the statements on the application were correct and that the insured was in good health. The card was signed by the insured, witnessed by the plaintiff and returned to the defendant. The insured
later died of a coronary disease. The trial court entered judgment for the
plaintiff. Held, the insured, on reading the application when he received the
policy, and failing to notify the defendant of the incorrect statements therein, was
guilty of such fraud that the policy was not valid. Reversed. Williams v. Black
Hills Benefit Life Association, (S. D. 1945) 19 N.W. (2d) 769.
It is the generally accepted rule in the United States that an insurance soliciting agent, in filling out an insurance application, acts as the agent of the
insurer. 1 It is also generally held that falsification of an application for insurance by the agent does not release the ivsurer from liability. This conclusion is
reached either on a theory of equitable estoppel, or on th!-! ground that the agent's
knowledge is to be imputed to his principal.2 It would seem that where the latter
theory is adopted, knowledge of the agent's falsification by the insured would not
be a bar to recovery. However, for the most part the cases that have followed
the imputed knowledge theory did not involve fraud or bad faith on the part of
the insured, 3 and it has been said, that where agent and insured conspired together to defraud the agent's principal, the court will not impute the agent's
knowledge to his principal. 4 The South Dakota court had previously followed
the theory of imputed knowledge.5 In seeking to limit the rule to situations
where good faith of the insured is shown, the court, in the principal case, relies

2d ed., § 125, p. 440 (1930).
See 8 1 A.L.R. 8 3 3 at 840 ( I 93 2) for discussion of theory and policy of the rule
and cases there cited.
8 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Brady, 42 Ga. App. 808, 157 S.E. 354
( I 931) •
4 Loftin v. Great Southern Home Benevolent Assoc., 9 Ga. App. 121, 70 S.E.
353 (19u).
5 Thomas v. Modern Brotherhood of America, 25 S.D. 632, 127 N.W. 572
(1910); Fosmark v. Equitable Fire Assn., 23 S.D. 102, 120 N.W. 777·(1909).
1 VANCE, INSURANCE,
2
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on a local statute.6 Did the insured, in the principal case, in fact participate in
the fraud of the soliciting agent? 7 The court distinguishes the principal case
from the Thomas case 8 on the ground that, in the latter case, the insured, on
discovering the false answer to a question in the application, immediately called
it to the attention of the agent, who advised him that the answer was immaterial.9 It is not entirely clear as to what degree of proof is necessary to show
fraud on the part of the insured.10 Some courts hold that failure to read a policy
delivered to the insured, and thus failing to discover that the terms of the policy
are not in accord with the application, does not remove liability from the insurer.11 A number of states follow the federal courts in holding the insured
bound to know the terms of his contract.12 Courts in the province of Quebec,
Canada interpret the contract for life insurance against the insurer even in cases
where maximum good faith on the part of the insured is lacking.13 In view of
the superior knowledge of insurance that an insurance agent has as compared to
the layman, and the consequent reliance by the applicant for insurance on the
statements of the agent, it is desirable that the courts be very slow in assuming
fraud on the part of the insured and require that the insurer prove beyond a
reasonable doubt, in a case such as the principal one, the bad faith of the insured.

Milton D. Solomon, S.Ed.
6

S.D. Code Ann. (1939) § 3.0208. "An agent can never have authority, either
actual or ostensible, to do an act which is, and is known or suspected by the person with
whom he deals to be, a fraud on the principal."
7
The company agent informed the insured that she had a "non-medical company at Rapid City for which she was writing." It is possible that the insured, when
he read over the insurance application, concluded that the misrepresentations of the
agent, in regard to his previous medical history, were not material.
8
See note 5, supra.
9
_Principal case at 771. Quaery: Would better faith of the insured have been
shown if he had notified the agent of the misrepresentations in the application and the
agent had reiterated that this was a non-medical company and further amplified his
statement by adding that a non-medical company issued policies regardless of the health
of the individual and'the representations in the application relating to the health of the
applicant were immaterial?
10
VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed.,§ 138, p. 524 (1930), " ••. to deprive him of his
claim of estoppel the insured's knowledge must be such as affects his conscience and negatives his good faith, that is actual knowledge of the facts involved in the claim of estoppel
or of such facts as put him on inquiry. Constructive or imputed knowledge is not
sufficient."
11
Northwestern National Ins. Co. of Milwaukee v. Chambers, 24 Ariz. 86, 206 P.
1081 (1922); Kister v. Lebanon Mutual Ins. Co., 128 Pa. 553, 18 A. 447 (1889).
12
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, II7 U.S. 519, 6 S. Ct. 837 (1886); Layton v. New York Life Ins. Co., 55 Cal. App. 202, 202 P. 958 (1921); Forwood v.
Prudential Ins. Co., n7 Md. 254, 83 A. 169 (1912).
18
"Misrepresentation in Life Insurance," 12 FORTNIGHTLY L. J. 294 (1943).
In Berthiaume and Thuot v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 48 REv. DE JuR. 16
(1942), the applicant for life insurance failed to reveal that three months prior to his
application he had spent four days in the hospital where he was found to be suffering
from chronic cholecystitis. The court, in holding against the defendant, stated, "By
fraud is meant actual fraud or intentional wrongdoing, and the burden of proof of such
•
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a state of affairs is on the insurer. In this particular case, the insurer failed to discharge
this burden, that is to show that the false statement in the application, was. made knowingly, with intention to deceive." Quoted from 12 FORTNIGHTLY L.J. 294.

